Indirect electronic and third-party conduct, and full relationship history, must be considered in cross-DVRO proceedings. . .

In reversal, the Second District held that a trial court considering cross-requests for DVROs must consider indirect electronic/third-party contact and parties' full domestic violence history in applying primary aggressor analysis.

Cross-petitions followed turbulent relationship. . .

Former boyfriend R.M. and former girlfriend A.G. each sought a DVRO against the other under the DVPA. The parties met at Pasadena City College in May 2022, began dating in October 2022, lived together for part of 2023, and ended their relationship in late 2023. Each alleged the other was physically, verbally, and emotionally abusive during the relationship. A.G. also alleged sexual assault. R.M., meanwhile, claimed A.G. falsely accused him of rape.

After the breakup, A.G. attempted to contact R.M. more than 1,000 times by phone, text, and social media direct messages, and appeared outside R.M.'s mother’s home in the early morning hours of February 12, 2024. R.M. viewed the repeated contact as harassment. During the same period, R.M. made social media posts and username changes that A.G. claimed were directed at her, including phrases such as "'A[.]G[.]ispsycho,'" "'ketaminewhor[e],'" "'pleasekillurself,'" and a sexualized reference to A.G.'s male friend. R.M. also posted or used images of A.G. taken during private or sexualized moments, posted A.G.’s phone number, and allegedly contacted A.G.'s mother, including a call in which he disclosed that A.G. had worked as a stripper.

In April 2024, R.M. petitioned for a DVRO against A.G. He alleged prior physical abuse, including scratches to his face and neck, and repeated unwanted post-breakup contact. The trial court granted a TRO protecting R.M. and his mother. In May 2024, A.G. petitioned for a DVRO against R.M. She alleged physical abuse, sexual assault, harassment, humiliation, intimidation, violation of privacy, encouragement of suicide, and damage to her professional reputation. Her supporting evidence included declarations from neighbors and a male friend, screenshots of messages in which R.M. apologized for hurting her "'emotionally and physically'" and admitted breaking into her home and smashing her phone, photographs of bruises and property damage, and screenshots of R.M.’s social media activity.

At a combined evidentiary hearing on the parties' mutual DVRO requests, the trial court (Los Angeles County's Martella) repeatedly limited the parties' testimony to events after the relationship ended, stating it was not interested in what occurred during the relationship. The trial court also characterized R.M. as having made no attempts to contact A.G. after the breakup, while A.G. admitted she had tried to contact R.M. about 1,000 times. The trial court granted R.M.'s DVRO request and denied A.G.'s request, finding insufficient evidence to restrain R.M. A.G. appealed both orders, and the Second District reversed.

Indirect electronic and third-party conduct may disturb the peace. . .

The panel began its analysis by describing the applicable law, explaining that the DVPA authorizes issuance of a DVRO upon reasonable proof of past abuse. Fam. C. §6203 defines abuse broadly and includes conduct that may be enjoined under Fam. C. §6320. Under Fam. C. §6320, a court may restrain conduct including harassing, telephoning, destroying personal property, contacting another person directly or indirectly, and disturbing the other party's peace. "Disturbing the peace" means conduct that, considering the totality of the circumstances, destroys the other party's mental or emotional calm. The conduct may be committed directly or indirectly, through a third party, and by any means, including electronic technologies.

With these legal principles in mind, the panel concluded that the trial court applied an unduly narrow understanding of "contact." The trial court's repeated statements that R.M. had not contacted A.G. were accurate only if indirect contacts were excluded from consideration. The panel noted that interpretation was inconsistent with the statutory language. The evidence of possible indirect contact included R.M.'s alleged telephone calls to A.G.'s mother and his alleged social-media conduct. For example, A.G. presented evidence that R.M. used private images of her, adopted usernames directed at her, posted sexually derogatory references, and changed his username to "'pleasekillurself'" shortly after A.G. asked whether he wanted her to kill herself. The timing of that username change, the panel observed, could support an inference that R.M. expected A.G. to see or learn about the post.

In reaching this conclusion, the panel rejected R.M.'s reliance on cases involving civil harassment restraining orders, noting the standards governing DVROs differ from those governing civil harassment restraining orders. The DVPA is intended to be applied liberally, the definition of abuse is broader, and the proof required is less demanding.

The panel held that because the record showed that the trial court did not reject A.G.'s evidence on credibility grounds, but instead failed to consider indirect contact as conduct potentially covered by the DVPA, a new hearing was required.

Cross-requests require primary aggressor analysis. . .

The Second District also reversed the DVRO granted to R.M., explaining that it could not stand while A.G.'s request was reheard under the required integrated primary aggressor analysis. Although substantial evidence could support that order if viewed in isolation, the panel held that the parties' cross-requests had to be considered together. More specifically, Fam. C. §6305 generally prohibits mutual orders restraining both parties unless the court makes detailed findings that both parties acted as primary aggressors and neither acted primarily in self-defense. In making that assessment, the trial court must consider the dominant aggressor factors in PC §836(c)(3). These include the statutory purpose of protecting domestic violence victims from continuing abuse, threats creating fear of physical injury, the history of domestic violence between the parties, and whether either party acted in self-defense.

The panel further noted the primary aggressor determination requires the trial court to weigh the parties' alleged acts against each other. A trial court may not analyze each party's allegations in isolation or treat events occurring at different times as unrelated. Thus, even where a party's conduct might independently justify a DVRO, the court must consider whether the party was a primary aggressor or instead acted primarily in self-defense. Here, nothing in the record showed that the trial court conducted the required analysis. Rather, the court treated the alleged abuse during the relationship as irrelevant. As a result, the panel concluded the trial court had to rehear both requests.

Full relationship history must be considere. . .

Finally, the panel emphasized that the new hearing could not be confined to post-breakup conduct. Fam. C. §6301(d) requires the court to consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether to grant or deny a DVRO. Moreover, the primary aggressor analysis necessarily requires consideration of the parties' history of domestic violence.

Accordingly, the Second District reversed the order denying A.G.'s request and the order granting R.M.'s request. The matter was remanded for a new evidentiary hearing on both requests.