Mother was not mentally incompetent or under duress so as to set aside dissolution judgment. . .

In affirmance, the Second District held trial court did not err by denying mother's request to set aside dissolution judgment on grounds of duress or mental incapacity pursuant to Fam C §2122, where during the period in question mother completed several financial transactions that demonstrated planning, organization, and communication with others.

On December 19, 2013, Susan Diamond filed for divorce from Troy Diamond after the parties' children move out of her house and in with Troy. Although Susan was initially represented by an attorney, her attorney withdrew due to Susan's lack of communication and cooperation. In a supporting declaration, the attorney said Susan failed to respond to his letters and telephone calls and failed to attend two appointments to discuss Troy's discovery requests. Susan was self-represented for the remainder of the action. Although Susan herself was a licensed attorney, she had not practiced law since 2000.

Trial on this matter was called on May 5, 2015. After Susan failed to appear, the trial proceeded uncontested. The trial court awarded sole legal and physical custody to Troy and ordered Susan to pay $724 per month in child support and to reimburse Troy $40,000 in child support expenses. The trial court also awarded Troy $220,000 in equalizing payments and $16,000 in attorney's fees. On November 25, 2015, the trial court entered judgment.

Susan's requests to set aside the dissolution judgment. . .
On November 11, 2016, Susan filed a request to set aside portions of the dissolution judgment pursuant to Fam C §2122(e), which authorizes stipulated or uncontested dissolution judgments to be set aside based on mistake of law or fact and further requires the motion be brought within one year of the date of entry of judgment. The trial court denied Susan's request after finding the request was barred by the disentitlement doctrine and that, in any case, the judgment was not the result of mistake within the meaning of Fam C §2122(e). Susan appealed, but the Second District dismissed the appeal as taken from a nonappealable order, reasoning "'[t]he issues raised by Susan Diamond's motion to set aside portions of the judgment were the same as would have arisen in an appeal from the judgment,'" which would have been untimely.

On November 21, 2017, Susan filed a second request to set aside the judgment, this time pursuant to Fam C §2122(c) & (d), which authorize a dissolution judgment to be set aside based on duress or mental incapacity, respectively, and further require the motion be brought within two years after the date of entry of judgment. In her supporting declaration, Susan argued, "'I had no idea that the Court was proceeding to trial in my case or that a default judgment would be entered against me at any time during 2015 or specifically on November 25, 2015. I was without any legal representation and was medically incapable of appearing in Court due to poor health, duress and mental incapacity resulting from the abuse and domestic violence against me by my ex-husband, Troy.'"

In support of her request to set aside the judgment, Susan submitted declarations from two doctors. Dr. Barry Unger declared that when he first examined Susan in early 2016, "'she was barely able to walk and was experiencing seizures and migraines.'" Dr. Unger added that testing revealed Susan had herniated discs, nerve impingement, and moderate cerebral atrophy. Dr. Unger opined that Susan would have been "'physically and mentally incapable of appearing in any type of court proceeding beginning November 2013… [, including] the period of time during 2015 and, more specifically, on November 25, 2015.'"

Troy's opposition. . .
Troy filed an opposition to Susan's request, arguing that Susan failed to present any evidence that she was incapacitated in 2014 or 2015. Troy further noted their children moved out of Susan's house because her then-boyfriend was abusing the youngest child (Sarah) and that Troy sought and received a restraining order precluding Susan from contacting Sarah. The oldest child (Katherine) submitted a declaration, noting that in 2014 "'my mother seemed fine; our conversations were normal; she did not appear to be "out of it" at any time. The house was usually clean and I did not notice anything about her that gave me concern. I did not observe her having any seizures or other behaviors that [gave] me any concern about my mother's mental state or intellect.'" Sarah also filed a declaration that noted that although she had limited contact with Susan during this period, on both occasions Susan was "'coherent.'"

Hearing on this matter was held over more than 20 days between March 2019 and October 2021. Three doctors testified for Susan, two of which opined that, due to several deficits in activities of daily living, Susan would have been incapacitated during the period in question and "'unable to participate in the legal process[.]'" Susan's third doctor, however, opined that Susan was not mentally incapacitated.

During her testimony, Susan said that Troy had been controlling and abusive throughout their marriage and that when she filed the dissolution action, she was afraid Troy would harm her. Susan testified that after the children moved out of her house, she felt "'extreme helplessness.'" She added that she had no friends and Troy would not let her see the children. Susan testified that she rarely left the house and that in 2014 and 2015 she "'was waiting to die.'" Susan explained that she had stopped checking her mail since she was unable to pay any of her bills. Although she recalled her attorney telling her in 2014 that she needed to respond to discovery requests, she noted that she was not concerned when she stopped hearing from her attorney because she thought he was working on a settlement. Susan claimed that she did not know the matter was proceeding to trial in May 2015. Although Susan admitted that she received a copy of the judgment in the mail in February 2016, she did not read it and instead put it aside to deal with later.

Despite claiming to be incapacitated from 2014 to 2016, Susan testified that she handled several financial transactions during this period, including selling personal items online, selling two cars, and selling her house. Susan also confirmed that, during this period, she wrote checks to her doctors and obtained a cashier's check to pay Katherine's tuition.

On April 29, 2022, the trial court (Los Angeles County's Riff) issued a preliminary statement of decision, denying Susan's request to set aside the dissolution judgment on both grounds of duress and mental incapacity. In so ruling, the trial court found Susan's testimony concerning her mental incapacity was not credible and that "'claims of mental incapacity (and duress) are likely not true or, at most, are extreme exaggerations of Susan's non-incapacitating underlying anxiety and depression conditions.'" On May 25, 2022, the trial court adopted its preliminary statement of decision as its final statement of decision. Susan appealed, but the Second District affirmed.

The panel began its analysis by describing the applicable law. Per Fam C §2122, a motion to set aside a judgment may be based on actual fraud, perjury, duress, mental incapacity, mistake of fact, or failure to comply with disclosure requirements. While such motions based on fraud, perjury, mistake, and failure to disclose must be brought within one year of the judgment, motions based on duress and mental incapacity must be brought within two years of the date of the entry of judgment.

After observing that Fam C §2122 does not define mental incapacity or duress, the justices turned to the standards set forth in the Probate and Civil Codes. The justices found most helpful Prob C §811(a) [enumerating 18 mental functions relevant to a determination whether a person lacks mental capacity] and CCP §372(a)(4) [a person lacks legal capacity if that person lacks capacity to understand the nature and consequences of action or proceeding and if a person lacks capacity to assist attorney in case preparation]. With these standards in mind, the justices concluded that, for purposes of Fam C §2122, a person lacks mental capacity when "the person suffers from a mental deficit that significantly impairs his or her ability to understand and appreciate the nature or consequences of his or her actions or of the family law proceeding."

Susan was not mentally incapacitated. . .
Applying these legal principles to the instant case, the justices concluded that the evidence did not compel a finding of mental incapacity. Although the trial court found Susan "'was likely depressed and anxious,'" which are two of the enumerated mental deficits under Prob C §811(a), Susan also undertook several financial transactions during the period in question that demonstrated planning, organization, and communication with others. For example, during the period in question, Susan sold her house and used the sale proceeds to pay her property taxes, obtained a cashier's check that she used to pay Katherine's tuition, wrote and cashed checks, and sold several personal property items. Susan also demonstrated that she was able to leave her home during this period, including to attend Katherine's graduation and to shop and run errands.

The justices further concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that Susan was unable to understand and appreciate the consequences of her failure to participate in the dissolution proceeding. First, Susan testified that she understood the dissolution action was moving forward, albeit she noted that she believed it was proceeding to settlement. Second, Susan admitted that she received a copy of the judgment in the mail in 2016 but decided not to read it until several months later. Third, Susan spent several years as a practicing lawyer. And fourth, Susan's testimony that she did not remember the two-year period in question was undermined by her insistence that certain events did or did not occur. For example, Susan insisted that Katherine did not visit her as often as Katherine claimed in her declaration. Susan also insisted that other witnesses who claimed to see Susan driving herself to family events were wrong.

Susan was not under duress. . .
Next, the justices concluded that the evidence did not compel a finding of duress. On this point, Susan argued the trial court erred by failing to find duress after she presented "'unrefuted evidence of domestic violence'" committed by Troy. The justices disagreed with Susan's characterization that the evidence was unrefuted, noting the trial court found Troy denied Susan's allegation of domestic violence and there was no corroborating evidence to support her claim. Moreover, the trial court expressly found Susan had not established Troy "'engaged in stalking or coercive control.'" Susan also argued that she was subjected to duress based on threats Troy made to keep the children from her beginning in August 2013. The justices again disagreed with Susan's characterization, noting there was no testimony that Troy ever threatened to keep the children away from Susan.

Lastly, the justices concluded the trial court did not err by failing to set aside the judgment as inequitable pursuant to Fam C §2125 [authorizing courts to set aside only the parts of the judgment materially affected or, when necessary and equitable, the entire judgment]. In rejecting Susan's argument, the justices first noted that Susan incorrectly interpreted the statute as empowering a court to set aside a judgment solely based on equitable considerations. Instead, Fam C §2125 only gives a court discretion to set aside an entire judgment based on equitable grounds once the court has already found the existence of one of the grounds to set aside the judgment under Fam C §2125. In support of their interpretation, the justices observed Fam C §2123, which explicitly prohibits a court from setting aside a judgment simply because the court finds that it was inequitable when made.

Accordingly, the Second District affirmed the trial court's order denying Susan's request to set aside the dissolution judgment.