Case of the Month Archive

The appellate clock starts in administrative mandate proceedings with an entry of judgment, not with the filing of an order. . .

In reversal, the California Supreme Court held that the time to appeal in administrative mandate proceedings begins with the entry of judgment, not with the filing of an order or other ruling, even where an appellate court might deem such a ruling appealable in order to vindicate the right of appeal.

In May 2019, the City of Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety (Department) imposed a 44-hour suspension on Officer David Meinhardt. The City of Sunnyvale Personnel Board (Board) later upheld the suspension. Meinhardt filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the trial court, naming the Board as the defendant and the Department as the real party in interest.

The August 6 order. . .
On August 6, 2020, the trial court ruled in favor of the Department and Board and filed a document entitled "'ORDER.'" This order contained factual findings and legal rulings. The order concluded with "the Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus DENIED." The court clerk served the order on the parties on August 6, 2020. On August 14, 2020, the Department and Board served Meinhardt with a judicial council form CIV-130 entitled "'Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order,'" along with a file-stamped copy of the order.

The September 25 judgment. . .
On September 4, 2020, the parties signed and submitted to trial court a document entitled "'JUDGMENT'" that stated, "'On August 6, 2020, the Court issued an Order Denying Petitioner David Meinhardt's Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus…. For the reasons set forth in the Order, the Court hereby enters Judgment for Respondents City of Sunnyvale, et al., and against Petitioner David Meinhardt, who shall take nothing by this action [¶] IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.'" The trial court signed this document on September 17, 2020. Meinhardt served this document on the Department and Board on September 22, 2020. The trial court entered the judgment on its docket on September 25, 2020.

On October 15, 2020, Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal from the September 25 judgment. The Fourth District dismissed the appeal as untimely under Cal Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1), which provides that notice of appeal must be filed within the earliest of (1) 60 days after the court clerk serves a file-endorsed copy of the judgment or a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment; (2) 60 days after service of either of those documents by a party; or (3) 180 days after entry of judgment. More specifically, the Fourth District concluded that the August 6 order was the "'final judgment' from which Meinhardt should have appealed because it 'denied' his mandate petition 'in its entirety and did not contemplate any further action in this case.'" The California Supreme Court granted review and reversed the judgment of the Fourth District and remanded for further proceedings.

The justices began their analysis by describing the relevant law regarding appealability of judgments in administrative mandate proceedings. They first observed that CCP §904.1 sets forth a list of appealable judgments and orders. Although the statute provides that some "orders" are appealable, an order granting or denying a petition for writ of administrative mandate is not one of these enumerated in the statute. Therefore, such appeal must be taken from a "judgment." In particular, CCP §904.1(a)(1) provides that an appeal must be taken "'from a judgment that is not intermediate or nonfinal but is the one final judgment.'" According to the justices, the purpose of the one final judgment rule is to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals that tend to be oppressive and costly. The justices further observed that, per CCP §1094.5, entry of judgment, and not the filing of an order, minute order, ruling, statement of decision, or any other differently entitled document, signals the end of the case in administrative mandate proceedings, for purposes of appealability. The justices noted that despite the one final judgment rule, appellate courts have deemed orders and other rulings to be "judgments" under certain circumstances, if the ruling is sufficiently final, in order to preserve a party's right to appeal. In fact, Cal Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2), which is entitled "Premature notice of appeal," provides "The reviewing court may treat a notice of appeal filed after the superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed immediately after entry of judgment."

Turning to this practice in the context of administrative mandate proceedings, the justices took note of two cases. In Tomra Pacific, Inc. v. Chiang (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 463, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 the First District held "We note that the order denying the petitions for a writ of mandate is not termed a judgment and does not explicitly address the declaratory relief causes of action. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the order before us constitutes an appealable final judgment as it left no issue for further consideration." Similarly, in Sandlin v. McLaughlin (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 805, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 874, the Fourth District held "Although the trial court never entered a formal judgment on the petition for writ of mandate, its order denying the petition in its entirety constitutes a final judgment for purposes of an appeal."

The entry of judgment, and not the filing of an order, begins the time to appeal. . .
In contrast to this practice of treating orders as appealable for the purpose of preserving an appeal, the high court noted that the Fourth District here used its discretion to deem a sufficiently final order as appealable for the purpose of dismissing the appeal. The justices focused on two reasons for "declin[ing] to construe a court's ruling as an appealable judgment for the purpose of barring appeal." First, such practice would contravene the well-established policy that the right to appeal is remedial in nature and should be permitted in doubtful cases. And second, permitting such practice would require litigants to guess as to which document triggers the duty to file a notice of appeal. On this latter point, the justices envisioned a scenario in which parties, unsure of which document triggers the appellate clock, would file multiple protective appeals, which would undercut the purpose of the one final judgment rule. Related to this concern, the justices noted that if the August 6 order was the "judgment" from which Meinhardt should have appealed, then the September 25 judgment would have been a nullity and, in fact, misleading. For these reasons, the justices concluded that "the time to appeal in administrative mandate proceedings begins with the entry of 'judgment' or service of notice of entry of 'judgment,' not with the filing of an 'order' or other ruling or service of notice of filing of such a ruling, even where an appellate court might deem such a ruling appealable in order to vindicate the right to appeal."

In so holding, the justices rejected the Department's argument that requiring a "judgment" to start the appellate clock would cause unnecessary delays in administrative mandate proceedings. The justices noted several reasons for their rejection of this argument. First, as noted, appellate courts may use their discretion to treat orders as judgments to permit appeals to proceed. Second, the justices expressed their confidence that the trial court, parties, and lawyers will work together to ensure judgments are promptly entered. And third, where delays do occur, parties may file a petition for writ of mandate to compel the trial court to enter judgment.

The justices also rejected the Department's argument that parties will attempt to persuade trial courts from entering judgment in order to extend the window for appellate review. On this point, the justices noted that a prevailing party has incentives to promptly submit a proposed judgment.

The September 25 judgment was not an irrelevant document. . .
The justices also rejected the Department's argument that the September 25 judgment was an irrelevant document, a mere formality. Instead, the justices noted a judgment is significant insofar as the time between the order and the judgment allows the parties to request and the trial court to make changes to the order or other ruling before the trial court loses jurisdiction. Once a judgment is entered, the trial court "'may correct judicial error only through certain limited procedures such as motions for new trial and motions to vacate the judgment.'"

Finally, the high court disapproved cases that dismissed, as untimely, appeals that were timely filed from entry of judgment, including Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School District (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 213; and City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 470. The justices also disapproved Valero Refining Company—California v. Bay Area Quality Management District Hearing Board (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 618, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 885, to the extent that it means the time to appeal begins with the filing of an order in writ proceedings, and not a subsequently entered judgment; and Natomas Unified School Dist. v. Sacramento Bd. of Education (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1013, 302 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, to the extent it suggests that if the order granting a petition for writ of administrative mandate had finally resolved all issues in the case, it would have been the judgment that commenced the running of the time to appeal.

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth District and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.