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A community's interest in a home is calculated at the time of separation, while the value of the property is calculated as near as practicable to the time of trial. . .

In affirmance, the Fourth District held trial court did not err by concluding the proper date for valuation of community property interest in spouse's separate real property was the date that was closer to time of trial rather than time of the parties' separation.

In December 2004, Rod and Hub Freeman registered as domestic partners. They later married in June 2008. In April 2020, they separated, and Rod filed a dissolution petition the following month.

At the time of their separation, both parties had been unemployed for seven years. During that time, Hub supported the parties, using income from a rental property in Los Angeles, Social Security, annuities, and dividends. Rod had purchased the rental property in 1992. Although the rental property was titled in Rod's name alone, the parties used community funds to pay the mortgage, which was eventually paid off in 2013.

The parties stipulated that Hub's gross monthly income available for support was $11,391 and the monthly marital standard of living was $12,381.

At trial, both parties introduced expert testimony concerning the value of the rental property. Rod's appraiser valued the property at $2.1 million as of February 2022. Hub provided testimony from two expert witnesses, the first who valued the property at $1.44 million as of January 2021 and the second who valued the property at $1.6 million as of March 2022.

At the conclusion of trial, the trial court (Riverside County's Anderson) found Rod's appraiser more credible and, thus, valued the property at $2.1 million. The trial court also adopted Rod's appraiser's conclusion that the community owned a 60.2 percent interest in the rental property. The trial court also ordered Hub to pay Rod $2,100 a month in permanent spousal support. In support of its spousal support order, the trial court applied Fam C §4320 [setting forth circumstances that must be considered when awarding spousal support]. Although the trial court found that Rod had marketable skills, his "'employment was impaired by HUB's request for ROD to take leave under [the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)] to care for HUB from April to September of 2015…. HUB further requested that ROD remain unemployed and travel with the income built over their 23-year relationship.'" Hub appealed, but the Fourth District affirmed.

Spousal support was reasonable. . .
On appeal, Hub argued the amount of spousal support awarded was disproportionate to the parties' marital standard of living. The panel disagreed. First, the justices pointed out that Hub cited no authority supporting his proposition that a spouse is entitled to only half the marital standard of living. Instead, the trial courts have the discretion to award spousal support that is greater than, equal to, or less than what the supported spouse requires to maintain the marital standard of living. Second, the $2,100 in spousal support was not unreasonable. Since Rod was 60 years old with health issues at the time of trial, his ability to find employment was limited. This ability was further limited by the fact that Hub had requested Rod to take FMLA leave for several months and thereafter asked him to remain unemployed so they could travel together. As such, the justices concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $2,100 per month in permanent spousal support.

Next, Hub argued the trial court improperly relied on Xspouse (a computer program used to calculate guideline child support) and the temporary spousal support order to calculate the permanent spousal support. The justices disagreed, noting that the trial court "carefully considered" the relevant factors set forth in Fam C §4320. In fact, the trial court's statement of decision spent five pages discussing these factors and, in contrast, only briefly mentioned either Xspouse or the temporary spousal support order. The justices further noted that the trial court awarded the permanent spousal support of $2,100 before any mention of either Xspouse or the temporary spousal support, a fact that further supports the conclusion that the permanent spousal support award was not based on either factor.

Valuation of property is calculated as near as practicable to the time of trial. . .
Regarding the value of the rental property, Hub argued the trial court erred by valuing the property closer to the time of trial rather than the time of separation. In support of his argument, Hub relied on In re Marriage of Mohler (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 788, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 221. The justices rejected Hub's argument, noting that he misread Mohler by conflating two concepts: the calculation of the community interest in a home and the valuation of the property. In the former instance, the Mohler court held that a community's interest in the home stopped accruing after separation. Therefore, the community interest is calculated at the time of separation. However, the Mohler court held that the valuation of the property is calculated as near as practicable to the time of trial, as set forth in Fam C §2552 [requires valuation of community assets and liabilities as near to trial date as practicable]. Here, Hub did not challenge the community interest in the property, only the valuation of the property. As such, the justices concluded that the trial court did not err by adopting the valuation of the rental property that was closer to the trial date instead of the separation date.

As his last point of contention, Hub argued his procedural due process rights were violated because his counsel was not given enough time during direct examination or to cross-examine Rod. More specifically, Hub argued that the parties agreed to equally divide the time for trial, but Rod used more than his allotted time. The justices rejected Hub's argument, since Hub did not raise an objection at the time, even though the trial court had instructed the parties to keep track of their own time.

For these reasons, the trial court affirmed the trial court's property division order.