Award of spousal support based on Form I-864 affidavit would be any difference between noncitizen wife's income and 125% of federal poverty guidelines. . .

In reversal, the Fourth District held the income of a sponsored immigrant should be considered in calculating the sponsor's support obligation under I-864 [affidavit of support establishing an agreement to maintain an immigrant at an income level of no less than 125 percent of the federal poverty level].

Sunday Adeyeye is a U.S. citizen born in Nigeria. He married Adebukola Faramaye, a Nigerian citizen. Adeyeye signed an I-864 affidavit of support undertaking financial responsibility for Faramaye as a condition to her immigration to the United States. Per the I-864 affidavit, Adeyeye is to "'[p]rovide the intending immigrant any support necessary to maintain him or her at an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for his or her household size[.]'" The I-864 affidavit also noted that a sponsor's obligations terminate only if the sponsored immigrant: (1) becomes a U.S. citizen; (2) has worked or can be credited with 40 qualifying quarters of coverage under the Social Security Act; (3) no longer has lawful permanent resident status and departs the U.S.; (4) obtains a new grant of adjustment of status in a removal proceeding; or (5) dies.

In 2023, Adeyeye filed a dissolution of marriage. A year later, Faramaye filed a request for order (RFO) seeking $1,569 per month in spousal support based on the I-864 affidavit. In support of her request, Faramaye noted the poverty guideline for a one-person household for 2024 was $15,060 per year. Faramaye concluded that Adeyeye had to pay $1,569 per month by dividing 125 percent of $15,060 by 12 months.

Adeyeye opposed Faramaye's request. He argued that Faramaye defrauded him by pretending to be interested in marriage when her true intention was to get a green card. In support of his opposition, Adeyeye filed a list of affirmative defenses, which included a claim that Faramaye committed perjury by lying about her employment. Specifically, Adeyeye noted Faramaye earned $57,900 per year, which was more than 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines and, therefore, his spousal support obligation should be reduced to zero.

After the trial court hearing (San Bernardino County's Towns) granted Faramaye's request and ordered Adeyeye to pay $1,569 per month until Faramaye reaches 40 qualifying quarters of work. The trial court noted none of the five circumstances terminating a sponsor's obligation applied stating, '"It's quite apparent, just based on the length of time [Faramaye] has been working, she hasn't been credited with 40 qualifying quarters of work.'" Adeyeye appealed, and the Fourth District reversed.

In a matter of first impression, the panel held that the award of spousal support based on Form I-864 affidavit would be any difference between noncitizen wife's income and 125% of federal poverty guidelines. In reaching this conclusion, the justices first addressed Faramaye's argument that the trial court's minute order is not appealable because '"no written order was filed and there is no final order on file."' The panel found the argument to be "unavailing" since the trial court's minute order did not direct a written order to be prepared per Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.104, 8.104(c)(2). In addition, CCP §901.1(a)(10) authorizes appeals from an order made appealable by the Family Code.

Second, Faramaye contended that Adeyeye forfeited his appellate arguments because he did not raise them in the RFO, made no references to the case law he cited on appeal, and did not file a motion for reconsideration. The justices disagree noting that Adeyeye submitted a list of affirmative defenses stating he did not owe any support due to Faramaye's income and he furthered this argument in trial court. Adeyeye did not need to file a motion for reconsideration and did not forfeit his arguments since he raised them in trial court proceedings and the cases cited in his appeal did not advance any new legal arguments.

While the five circumstances concern the termination of a sponsor's obligations, they do not address what, if anything, the sponsor owes to maintain the sponsored immigrant at an annual income that is at least 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines. . .
The justices determined that the trial court erred in its reliance on the five circumstances related to the termination of a sponsor's obligation. The trial court in granting the RFO until Faramaye was '"credited with 40 qualifying work hours"' did not address the sponsor's duties to maintain the sponsored immigrant at an annual income equal to 125% of the federal poverty guidelines and whether the sponsor immigrant's income is relevant to the minimum level of financial support.

First, the panel looked at the decisions of several courts that have concluded that a sponsored immigrant's income should be deducted from the 125% threshold. The New Jersey appellate court in Naik v. Naik (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) 399 N.J. Super. 390, 944 A.2d 713 held that the sponsor is not necessarily required to pay the sponsored immigrant, rather the sponsor must pay any deficiencies to meet the minimum amount considering the sponsored immigrant's income, assets, and other sources of support. Similarly in Love v. Love (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) 33 A.3d 1268, the Pennsylvania appellate court found that a trial court should consider the '"immigrant spouse's actual income from all sources without inflating the figure by adding theoretical earning capacity to the calculation."' Finally, the Georgia appellate court held in Backman v. Backman (2022) 364 Ga.App. 549, 875 S.E.2d 510 that a sponsor is only required to pay the difference between the sponsored immigrant's income and the poverty threshold.

Finally, the panel considered the plain language and statutory purpose of the I-864 affidavit. The plain language in the I-864 states the sponsor must provide '"any support necessary to maintain'" (italics added) sponsored immigrant '"at an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines."' To satisfy the minimal requirement, Adeyeye had to provide "any support necessary" which in turn requires consideration of Faramaye's income. The statutory purpose of the I-864 affidavit is to "prevent the sponsored immigrant from becoming a public charge." If an interpretation ignores the sponsored immigrant's own income, it would impose a greater burden not supported by the language of the I-864 affidavit.

Accordingly, the Fourth District remanded for trial court to consider Faramaye's income in determining whether and the extent to which she is entitled to support under the I-864 affidavit. Adeyeye is required to pay the difference, in any, between Faramaye's income and 125% of the federal poverty guidelines. The Fourth District leaves to the trial court to determine what financial resources, in any, qualify as Faramaye's income.